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BOOTSTRAPS AND CAPITAL GAIN-A 
PARTICIPANT'S VIEW OF 
COMMISSIONER v. CLAY BROWN 
William H. Kinsey* 
I. BACKGROUND OF Commissioner v. Clay Brown1 
ACLOSELY held corporation may be sold in a variety of ways. At one end of the spectrum is an all-cash sale. In such a trans-
action, the seller receives the purchase price and has no further con-
cern with the economic well-being of the business. The difficulty 
with this method, of course, is finding a purchaser with sufficient 
cash who is willing to pay a fair price. 
At the other end of the spectrum is a full-fledged bootstrap sale, 
where there is no down payment other than from the underlying 
assets of the sold corporation, and the purchaser's obligation to pay 
the purchase price over a period of years is dependent upon income 
generated by the underlying corporate assets and upon the assets 
themselves. Because of this dependency, a bootstrap seller remains 
vitally interested in the economic well-being of the corporation until 
the purchase price is fully paid. 
Benveen these nvo extremes are sales where some down payment 
is made from independent sources, and the purchaser assumes per-
sonal liability for all or a portion of the purchase price. The signif-
icance of the· purchaser's assumption of personal liability naturally 
depends upon his financial affluence. 
A. Impact of Capital Gain Treatment 
A motivating factor in any sale of a closely held corporation is 
the ability of the seller to report his profit as long-term capital gain. 
Few closely held corporations would be sold for an all-cash purchase 
price if the gains from such sales were taxable as ordinary income. 
Similarly, few bootstrap transactions would be undertaken if the re-
sulting gains were taxable as ordinary income. Denying capital-gain 
treatment to either type of sale may have the practical effect of 
banning such sales. 
The purchase price in a bootstrap sale may be greater than the 
purchase price in an all-cash sale. However, it is no more accurate 
• Member of the :Bars of Oregon, New York, and Michigan. Mr. Kinsey briefed 
and argued the Clay Brown case before the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Ci;rcuit, and the United States Supreme Coux:t.-Ed. 
I. 380 U.S. 563 (1965). 
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to assume that the purchase price in a bootstrap sale is unreasonably 
high than it is to assume that the purchase price in an all-cash sale 
is unreasonably low. Neither the possibility of an excessive purchase 
price nor the possibility of other abuse is sufficient reason to ban 
bootstrap sales through judicial determination that they fail to com-
ply with the "sale" prerequisite for capital-gain treatment. This was 
the broad holding of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Clay 
Brown. An understanding of the case may be facilitated by a review 
of the nature and mechanics of bootstrap sales along the lines pre-
sented to the Supreme Court in the taxpayers' brief. 
B. Typical Bootstrap Situation 
In a typical bootstrap situation, S owns all the stock of corpora-
tion X, which S believes to be worth a specified sum. P, perhaps a 
key employee, desires to purchase corporation X, but he may not 
have sufficient cash to pay the price demanded by S. Nevertheless, S 
may be willing to entertain a purchase offer from P under an ar-
rangement whereby P will pay the agreed price over a reasonable 
period of time with funds generated by the X assets. 
I£ P purchases the X stock and pays the purchase price from after-
tax income of X distributed to P as dividends, each dollar of income 
generated by the X assets will be subject to the corporate tax and 
also to the tax on P's personal income. Assuming a 52 per cent cor-
porate tax rate,2 48 cents would remain out of each generated dollar 
after payment of the corporate tax. If the dividends subject P to a 
70 per cent individual tax rate, the 48 cents less the 70 per cent in-
dividual tax would leave a net 14.4 cents out of each dollar gener-
ated by the X assets for payment by P upon the purcp.ase price. 
Obviously, P must devise a better proposition if he is to interest S 
in selling corporation X under an arrangement where the purchase 
price will be paid out of income generated by the X assets. 
I. Standard Plan for Bootstrap Sales 
Elimination of the necessity for dividend extraction in the fore-
going purchase plan would subject each generated dollar to only the 
corporate tax, thus leaving 48 cents for payment upon the purchase 
price. A more or less standard plan accomplishes this objective. P 
forms new corporation Y with nominal capital, and Y (not P) pur-
2. Although the present corporate tax rate on net income in excess of $25,000 is 
48%, a 52% rate is assumed in this article because that rate was in effect during the 
years involved in the Clay Brown case. 
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chases the X corporation stock from S for a price payable over a 
period of years.8 Forthwith, corporation X is liquidated into Y, 
with corporation Y taking over all of the assets and liabilities of X.4 
Upon receipt of the X assets, corporation Y grants a mortgage 
thereon to S, securing Y's obligation to pay the purchase price. The 
stock of corporation Y may be deposited in escrow as additional col-
lateral security. Corporation Y pays the purchase price out of income 
generated from its ownership and operation of the former X assets. 
The income generated by corporation Y's operation of the former X 
assets is not taxed as a dividend to P (or anyone else) when paid 
upon the purchase price. No dividend distributions are required, 
since the purchase-price obligor and the owner and operator of the 
assets are the same entity. 
While the standard plan assures a minimum of 48 cents out of 
each dollar generated by the underlying corporate assets for payment 
upon the purchase price, it is not easy to pay for a business with 
48-cent dollars. The objective is to obtain something in excess of 
the 48-cent minimum, and this may be possible as a result of the 
additional cash flow available to purchasing corporation Y, which 
was not available to acquired corporation X. Cash flow is net tax-
able income plus depreciation and other deductions not requiring a 
cash outlay. For example, if a corporation has $100,000 of income 
and $50,000 of depreciation, the corporation has $50,000 of net tax-
able income ($100,000 less $50,000 depreciation) subject to a tax of 
$26,000 (52 per cent of $50,000), leaving $74,000 available for pay-
ment upon the purchase price. Assuming that the foregoing reflects 
the amount of depreciation available to Y corporation after the con-
3. Since the purchase price is payable over a period of years, S desires to report the 
purchase price on the installment basis. This accounts for S's selling the stock rather 
than having X corporation sell assets to new corporation Y. If X corporation sold 
assets, it would be necessary to comply with § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code to 
preclude recognition of gain upon the sale. Qualification under § 337 requires com-
plete liquidation of corporation X within twelve months, and distribution of corpo-
ration P's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would result in im-
mediate capital gain tax to X based on the present value of the deferred payments. 
All of this is avoided, and S is entitled to elect the installment method under 
§ 453(b)(l)(B), when he sells stock and does not receive more than 30% of the purchase 
price during the year of sale. 
4. No gain is recognized to X corporation on the distribution of its assets to Y 
corporation as liquidating distributions. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 336. However, 
depreciation recapture may be required by § 1245 or § 1250. See Part VII infra. Y 
corporation obtains an immediate cost basis for the X corporation stock equal to the 
full purchase price. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1012. No gain is recognized to Y 
corporation upon receipt of the X assets as liquidating distributions. Recognition of 
gain is expressly precluded by § 332, but Y corporation would not have any gain 
upon the liquidation even in the absence of § 332, since Y corporation has a cost basis 
for the X corporation stock equal to the full purchase price. 
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summation of the transaction, the effect would be to leave 74 cents 
of each generated dollar for payment on the price of the X stock. 
Obtaining an increased cash flow for purchasing corporation Y 
does not require exploitation of a tax loophole. One of the funda-
mental principles of our tax system is that every purchaser obtains 
a tax _basis for acquired property equal to the purchase price, and 
he is entitled to recoup this basis in some way and at some time 
without payment of any tax. Under section 334(b)(2) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the purchaser--corporation Y-obtains a basis for 
the former X assets equal to the purchase price which Y agrees to pay 
for the X stock, plus the liabilities of X assumed upon the liquida-
tion of X into Y.5 
The number of after-tax cents per dollar generated by the un-
derlying assets will exceed the 48-cent minimum to the extent that 
_corporation Y is able to correlate payments upon the purchase price 
with recoupment of the cost basis. A perfect correlation would result 
in 100 cents after taxes out of each dollar generated by the former X 
assets. Since depreciation is a primary method of basis recoupment, 
if all the assets acquired by corporation Y consisted of depreciable 
property, and if payment of the purchase price coincided exactly 
·with the economic life of that depreciable property, there would 
be perfect correlation producing 100-cent dollars. The acme of 
100-cent dollars is seldom, if ever, attained in a bootstrap sale, be-
cause not all the assets are depreciable, and because the seller desires 
payment as quickly as possible. It is possible, however, to approach 
the acme and substantially exceed the 48-cent minimum.6 
2. Tax Exempt Purchasers 
Tax exempt institutions have a competitive advantage ~n the 
bootstrap field if income generated by the underlying assets can be 
realized in a manner which avoids the tax imposed upon unrelated 
business income.7 Rental from a lease for not more than five years is 
excluded from unrelated business income;8 consequently, such 
5. Treas. Reg. § l.334-l(c)(4)(viii) (1955). 
6. See Part IV infra for an example of sales where the acme of 100-cent dollars is 
achieved as a matter of course. 
7. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 511. 
8. Section 512(b)(3)•(4) of the Code excludes from unrelated business income all 
rental except that from business leases as defined in § 514. Section 514(b) defines a 
business lease as a lease for a term of more than five years if there is a business lease 
indebtedness with respect to the property. In a bootstrap purchase, there would be 
a business lease indebtedness, so the applicability of § 514 may be avoided by limiting 
the lease term to not more than five years. 
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leases are commonly used by tax exempt institutions in bootstrap 
transactions. Utilization of the rental exemption, however, requires 
modification of the standard bootstrap plan. Rather than operating 
the acquired assets, as in the case of the ordinary purchasing corpo-
ration, the tax exempt purchaser leases the assets to an operating 
company under a lease for not more than five years. The bootstrap 
attributes are retained, since no down payment is made except from 
the acquired assets, and liability for the purchase price is limited to 
the rental received. 
To present an attractive bootstrap proposal, a tax exempt insti-
tution must receive at least 75 per cent of the income generated by 
the underlying corporate assets, particularly if the institution retains 
a portion of the income during th~ pay-out period. A formula which 
has been developed by certain institutions requires rental payments 
equal to 80 per cent of the operating company's net income. The 
institution retains IO per cent of the rental and pays the remaining 
90 per cent to the sellers for application upon the purchase price. 
This particular formula, which was employed in the Clay Brown 
transaction, produces 72 cents out of each dollar generated by the 
underlying corporate assets for payment upon the purchase price. 
The 72 cents is 90 per cent of the 80 cents received as rental by the 
tax exempt institution from each dollar realized by the operating 
company. 
While the institute applies its tax exemption to the rental re-
ceived under the five-year lease, it does not follow that all of the 
rental paid by the operating company to the tax exempt purchaser 
would incur a corporate tax if the institution were a tax paying 
entity. Every purchaser, irrespective of any tax exemption, receives 
a basis for the acquired assets equal to the purchase price. As re-
viewed above, tax-free recoupment of basis may produce after-tax 
results which substantially exceed the 48-cent minimum and ap-
proach the 100-cent ideal. 
Since the purchase price in a bootstrap sale is dependent upon 
income generated by the underlying corporate assets, a prudent 
seller, as part of his security, insists upon managerial control until 
the purchase price has been paid. Such an arrangement is particu-
larly necessary when the purchaser is not prepared to supply com-
petent management. Ordinarily, a tax exempt purchaser does not 
provide management, so the operating company is managed by the 
person or persons who formerly managed the acquired corporation.9 
9. In the Clay Brown case, the Tax Court clas.5ified the management contract be-
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If the Clay Brown transaction had been handled under the stan-
dard bootstrap plan utilizing a business corporation rather than a 
tax exempt entity as purchaser, each dollar generated by the Clay 
Brovm & Company assets would have left the following amounts 
per dollar after taxes available for payment upon the purchase price: 
70 cents the first year, 67 cents the second year, 64 cents the third 
year, 62 cents the fourth year, and 60 cents the fifth year-an aver-
age of 65 cents for the five-year period.1° Comparison of the 72-cent 
dollars produced by the Clay Brown transaction utilizing a tax ex-
empt institution with the 65-cent dollars which could have been 
generated with the same assets under the standard bootstrap plan 
gives the transaction a complexion different from the pallor cast by 
a comparison of the Clay Brown results with the 14.4-cent dollars 
which would have been available to an individual purchaser.11 Never-
theless, the Commissioner used hypothetical transactions producing 
14.4-cent dollars as the norm for his comparisons. As the taxpayers 
asserted before the Supreme Court in Clay Brown, no one can be 
expected to buy a business with 14.4-cen't dollars. 
tween the seller, Clay Brown, and the operating company as a part of the security 
instruments. See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461, 483 (1961). 
10. Computation of these percentages is set forth in the table below, which is based 
upon the following realistic assumptions: $1,000,000 of the purchase price for the 
Clay Brown & Company stock is allocated to depreciable property. In all probability, 
the sum of $1,170,000 could have been allocated to depreciable property and timber, 
so the $1,000,000 assumption is conservative. REv. Proc. 62-2, 1962·2 CuM. BuLL. 418, 
setting forth guidelines for depreciation, specifies a useful life of ten years for a saw• 
mill and its equipment, the assets involved in Clay Brown. There is no salvage value 
required under these guidelines, since the period specified takes salvage value into 
account. That is, a ten-year useful life is the same as a nine-year useful life with 10% 
salvage. The declining-balance method of depreciation (l½ times) is used. Annual 
earnings of $350,000 before depreciation and taxes are also assumed. 
1st year 2d year 3d year 4th year 5th year 
l. Earnings before 
depreciation $350,000 $350,000 $350,000 $350,000 $350,000 
2. Depreciation 150,000 127,500 108,375 92,120 78,305 
---3. Taxable income 200,000 222,500 241,625 257,880 271,695 
4._ Tax=52% 104,000 115,700 125,645 134,100 141,280 
5. Net Income 96,000 106,800 115,980 123,780 130,415 
6. Add back 
depreciation 150,000 127,500 108,375 92,120 78,305 
---7. Cash flow $246,000 $234,300 $224,355 $215,900 $208,720 
--- -- --- --- ---Cents of cash flow 
per dollar generated 
(ratio between 
line 7 and line 1) 70.3 67.0 64.1 61.7 59.6 
11. See text accompanying note 2 supra. 
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II. THE COMMISSIONER'S ATIACK 
In Revenue Ruling 54-420,12 the Commissioner launched a three-
pronged attack against bootstrap sales involving tax exempt institu-
tions. One thrust of the attack denied capital-gain treatment to the 
sellers. Considerable litigation ensued, and the controversy eventu-
ally reached the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Clay Brown. 
The particular facts of the case are concisely related in the Court's 
opinion.18 
The Commissioner based his denial of capital-gain treatment 
solely upon the bootstrap attributes of the transaction. Whether the 
purchaser is a business corporation generating income from direct 
operation of the acquired assets, or whether the purchasing corpora-
tion is a tax exempt institution deriving income from a lease of the 
assets to an operating company, the bootstrap attributes are the same 
-payment of the purchase price is dependent upon income gener-
ated by the underlying assets and upon the assets themselves. Con-
sequently, the Commissioner's attack in Clay Brown was not con-
fined to sales involving tax exempt institutions, but rather was aimed 
at all bootstrap sales. In fact, the Commissioner's attack applied not 
12. 1954-2 CUM. BULL, 128. 
13. "The basic facts are undisputed. Clay Brown, members of his family and three 
other persons owned substantially all of the stock in Clay Brown and Company . • • • 
Clay Brown, the president of the company and spokesman for the group, was ap-
proached by a representative of California Institute for Cancer Research in 1952, and 
after considerable negotiation the stockholders agreed to sell their stock to the Institute 
for $1,300,000, payable $5,000 down from the assets of the company and the balance 
within 10 years from the earnings of the company's assets. It was provided that simul-
taneously with the transfer of the stock, the Institute would liquidate the company 
and lease its assets for five years to a new corporation, Fortuna Sawmills, Inc., formed 
and wholly owned by the attorneys for the sellers. Fortuna would pay to the Institute 
80% of its operating profit without allowance for depreciation or taxes, and 90% of 
such payments would be paid over by the Institute to the selling stockholders to apply 
on the $1,300,000 note. This note was noninterest bearing, the Institute had no obli-
gation to pay it except from the rental income and it was secured by mortgages and 
assignments of the assets transferred or leased to Fortuna. If the payments on the note 
failed to total $250,000 over any two consecutive years, the sellers could declare the 
entire balance of the note due and payable. The sellers were neither stockholders nor 
directors of Fortuna but it was provided that Clay Brown was to have a management 
contract with Fortuna at an annual salary and the right to name any successor man-
ager if he himself resigned. 
"The transaction was closed on February 4, 1953. Fortuna immediately took over 
operations of the business under its lease, on the same premises and with practically 
the same personnel which had been employed by Clay Brown and Company. Effective 
October 31, 1954, Clay Brown resigned as general manager of Fortuna and waived his 
right to name his successor. In 1957, because of a rapidly declining lumber market, 
Fortuna suffered severe reverses and its operations were terminated. Respondent sellers 
did not repossess the properties under their mortgages but agreed they should be sold 
by the Institute with the latter retaining 10% of the proceeds. Accordingly, the prop-
erty was sold by the Institute for $300,000. The payments on the note from rentals 
and from the sale of the properties total~d $936,131.85." 380 U.S. at 566. 
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only to bootstrap sales of closely held corporations, but also to all 
other transfers for deferred payments contingent on future income. 
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Commis-
sioner's contention that bootstrap attributes preclude compliance 
with the "sale" prerequisite for capital-gain treatment. 
A. Economic Substance of Bootstrap Sales 
No attempt was made by the taxpayers in Clay Brown to rely 
upon mere formulistic compliance with the "sale" prerequisite for 
capital-gain treatment. Similarly, the taxpayers did not minimize 
the bootstrap attributes of the transaction. They fully recognized 
th~t payment of the purchase price was completely dependent upon 
income generated by the underlying corporate assets and upon the 
assets themselves. No down payment was made from independent 
sources, and the Institute's liability to pay the purchase price was 
limited to income generated by the business. For economic sub-
stance, the taxpayers relied upon the substantial change of economic 
benefits which occurred despite the bootstrap attributes. 
After a seller of stock in a bootstrap transaction executes the 
stock purchase agreement, each dollar paid to him from income gen-
erated by the underlying corporate assets is applied to the purchase 
price. When the sum of the payments equals the purchase price, all 
interest of the seller terminates, and the purchaser becomes the sole 
mmer of the business. While payment of the purchase price in a 
bootstrap sale usually requires a number of years, a change in eco-
nomic benefits occurs upon execution of the purchase agreement. 
Thereafter the seller has no alternative but to relinquish all rights 
when the purchase price has been paid. Each payment upon the pur-
chase price made from income increases the equity of the purchaser 
and hastens the complete termination of the seller's interest. Only 
in the event of default will the seller recapture the property. 
A bootstrap seller could well insist that all cash flow not needed 
in the business be devoted to payment of the purchase price. How-
ever, a less stringent requirement is imposed under transactions of 
the Clay Brown type. The tax exempt purchas-er is entitled to re-
tain ten per cent of the rental received from the operating company. 
In bootstrap sales not involving tax exempt institutions, the pur-
chaser may also be allowed to use a small portion of cash flow for 
something other than payments upon the purchase price or capital 
improvements. Such interim enjoyment of a portion of the income 
permitted the purchaser during the pay-out period represents some 
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change in economic benefits, but the change which affords real eco-
nomic substance is the potential termination of the seller's interest 
upon full payment of the purchase price and the emergence of the 
purchaser with free and clear title. 
In the Clay Brown case, an effort was made by the Commissioner 
in the Tax Court to negate the change in economic benefit which 
resulted from the ability of the Institute to acquire the business free 
and clear upon payment of the purchase price. · He contended that 
the Institute was never intended to be the ultimate owner of the 
business, since a tacit understanding existed between the parties 
which permitted the taxpayers to collapse the transaction and recap-
ture the assets through an artificial triggering of a default. Substan-
tiation of such a tacit understanding would have drained the trans-
action of economic substance. 
To refute the Commissioner's contention that such a tacit under-
standing had been made by the parties, the taxpayers pointed to the 
extensive price negotiations and to the testimony of the Institute's 
president that the primary motivation of the Institute was the pros-
pect of obtaining the assets free and clear after the purchase price 
had been fully paid, in order to convert th~ property into money for 
use in cancer research. If the Institute had never been intended to 
end up with a clear title to the assets, the extensive price negotia~ 
tions were mere window dressing, and the president of the Institute 
was less than candid in his testimony concerning the primary moti-
vation of the parties. In rejecting the Commissioner's contention, 
the Tax Court found that the price was the result of bona fide ne-
gotiations in an arm's-length transaction devoid of any plan or ar-
rangement for artificially triggering a· default.14 The Tax Court fur-
ther found that basic to the entire transaction was the taxpayer's 
obligation to relinquish all interest in the underlying corporate 
assets upon payment of the purchase price. In the opinion of the 
Tax Court, this change of interest constituted a real change of eco-
nomic benefits.15 
14. "Upon consideration of all the evidence in this case we hold that the trans-
action constituted a bona fide sale by petitioners to the institute arrived at in arm's-
length negotiations and devoid of any tacit understanding of the parties to collapse 
the deal at a time deemed appropriate by petitioners or of any plan or arrangement 
for artificially triggering a default." 37 T.C. at 486. 
15. "Petitioners by the transaction here involved parted with their equitable owner-
ship of the assets when they transferred the stock to the Institute .••• This change of 
interest constitutes a change of economic benefits thus distinguishing this case from 
the cases relied on by respondent. In the present case the stock was transferred out-
right to the Institute and such transfer was basic to the entire transaction .••• " Id. at 
484. 
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Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the 
Commissioner abandoned his contention that there had been a tacit 
understanding between the parties, but he nevertheless asserted that 
the control exercised over the operation of the business by Clay 
Brown through his management contract permitted the taxpayers, 
as a practical matter, to cause a default and recapture the assets. 
However, the taxpayers pointed out that a purposefully induced 
default would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement 
and that tax consequences are not determined by rights which a 
party may exercise through breach of agreements.16 
In the presentation before the Supreme Court, the Commissioner 
made no assertions militating against the fact that all the interest of 
the selling taxpayers would terminate upon full payment of the pur-
chase price, and Mr. Justice White emphasized this point in the ma-
jority opinion.17 Similarly, Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring 
opinion, stated that the taxpayers relinquished important rights as 
a result of the transaction and received something substantially dif-
ferent in return.18 
B. Risk-Shifting 
Ignoring any change in economic benefits resulting from the tax-
payers' obligation to relinquish all interest upon payment of the 
purchase price, the Commissioner based his argument before the 
Supreme Court upon the lack of any risk-shifting after the execution 
of the purchase agreement. Since payment of the purchase price was 
dependent upon income generated by the underlying corporate 
assets, the taxpayers retained the risk of economic adversity. Having 
invested nothing and having assumed no personal liability, the In-
stitute could lose nothing if the business were unable to pay the 
purchase price. 
The taxpayers acknowledged their vital stake in the economic 
16. See 325 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963). 
17. See 380 U.S. at 569. 
18. Id. at 580. In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Goldberg stated: "Brown retained 
full control over the operation of the business; the risk of loss and the opportunity 
to profit from gain during the normal operation of the business shifted but slightly. 
If the operation lost money, Brown stood to lose; if it gained money, Brown stood 
to gain, for he would be paid off faster." Id. at 587. It is not clear why Mr. Justice 
Goldberg believed that "the opportunity to profit from gain during the normal oper-
ation of the business shifted but slightly," particularly since he stated that there 
would be a faster payoff if the operation gained money. The faster the payoff, the 
faster all rights of Brown would terminate, and the Institute would emerge with the 
property free and clear. This is something more than a slight shift of economic benefit. 
Perhaps the phrase "during the normal operation of the business" is meant to presume 
a purchase price which will require normal operations before payment is effectuated, 
If so, the statement is understandable, but the presumption concerning the purchase 
price finds no support in the Clay Brown facts. 
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welfare of the business until the purchas~ price was paid, but con-
tended that, with respect to capital-gain treatment, tbe significance 
of risk-shifting is no greater than the consequences which may evolve 
from the lack of shift. In this regard, the only consequence which 
can result from the risk retained by a seller in a bootstrap sale is 
that he will receive something less than the agreed purchase price. 
As was asked by the taxpayers in their brief, why should the mere 
possibility that a seller might receive less than the agreed purchase 
price preclude capital-gain treatment for amounts actually re-
ceived?19 In what may become a classic statement in the area of 
capital-gains taxation, Mr. Justice White exposed the fallacy in the 
Commissioner's risk-shifting contention: 0 
To say that there is no sale because there is no risk-shifting 
and that there is no risk-shifting because the price to be paid 
is payable only from the income produced by the business sold, 
is very little different from saying that because business earn-
ings are usually taxable as ordinary income, they are subject to 
the same tax when paid over as the purchase price of property. 
This argument has rationality but it places an unwarranted con-
struction on the term "sale," is contrary to the policy of the 
capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and has 
no support in the cases. We reject it.20 
The Commissioner's argument concerning risk-shifting was also 
interspersed with frequent use of the term "transfer with income 
reserved." It was never made clear exactly what substantive support 
this term gave the risk-shifting argument, or how the lack of risk-
shifting converted what would otherwise be a sale into a "transfer 
with income reserved." Neither the majority nor the concurring 
or dissenting opinions took cognizance of the term. 
C. Impact of the Purchase Price Upon Economic Substance 
Since the purchaser in a bootstrap transaction bears no · risk of 
economic loss, he might content himself with the fringe benefits 
19. As was further pointed out by the taxpayers in their brief, where persons 
purposefully transfer property for less than the acknowledged value at the time of 
the transfer, the existence of a sale has never been questioned. In such situations, the 
problem is one of how the transferee should account for the bargain portion of his 
"bargain purchase." If the purchaser is an employee, the bargain portion is com-
pensation. Treas. Reg. § l.61-2(d)(2) (1957). If the purchaser is a family member, the 
bargain portion is a gift. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-l(e) (1957). 
20. 380 U.S. at 570. This statement is buttressed by the following quotation from 
Mr. Justice White's opinion: "To require a sale for tax purposes to be to a financially 
responsible buyer who undertakes to pay the purchase price from sources other than 
earnings of the assets sold or to make a substantial down payment seems to us at 
odds with commercial practice and common understanding of what constitutes a sale.'' 
Id. at 575. 
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accruing during the pay-out period (such as the ten per cent of the 
rental which the Institute was permitted to keep) and let the seller 
name his own purchase price. An unreasonably large purchase price 
could nullify the economic substance attributable to the termina-
tion of all the seller's interest upon full payment. Indeed, if the 
purchase price is so high that default and recapture of the assets are 
foregone conclusions at the time of transfer, there is no economic 
substance, and the transaction is a sham in the mold of J(olkey v. 
Commissioner.21 Similarly, if it is reasonably certain at the time of 
transfer that the assets will be exhausted by the burden of paying 
the purchas~ price, the seller will have relinqui.shed little or nothing 
by virtue of the agreement that the purchaser will end up with the 
assets free and clear upon payment of the price. Again, the transac-
tion would lack economic substance.22 In oral argument before the 
Supreme Court, the taxpayers acknowledged the potential abuses in 
bootstrap sales, and that such potential justifies scrutiny of the trans-
action by the trial court. However, the mere possibility of abuse fur-
nishes no ground for an appellate court to disallow capital-gain treat-
ment when the trial court has approved the bona fide nature of the 
transaction. 
During the Tax Court hearing in Clay Brown, the Commissioner 
did not question the reasonableness of the purchase price. Although 
the Tax Court found that the price was the result of real negotia-
tions arrived at in an arm's-length transaction and that the Institute 
was motivated by the primary objective of ending up with the assets 
free and clear,23 such findings were not attributable to any chal-
lenge of the purchas~ price by the Commissioner. Rather, as pre-
viously related, such findings were made by the Tax Court in sub-
stantiation of the taxpayers' response to the Commissioner's assertion 
that, because of a tacit understanding which permitted the taxpayers 
21. 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958). 
22. See Part V infra for a discussion of the proposition that capital gain is not 
precluded by the transferor's ownership of stock in the transferee corporation. The 
right of the transferor to own stock in the transferee may confer as much control over 
the business as the ability to recapture the assets upon an inevitable foreclosure or 
to exhaust the assets in the process of paying the purchase price. Consequently, such 
economic substance may not be absolutely essential to capital-gain recognition, al-
though it is most helpful. 
23. The following quotations from the Tax Court's opinion arc pertinent: 
"The primary motivation of the institute ••• was the prospect of ending up with 
the assets free and clear after the purchase price had been fully paid, which 
would then permit the institute to convert the property into money for use in 
cancer research." 37 T.C. at 471. 
"The price ••• was the result of real negotiating." Id. at 486. 
"The finally agreed price was arrived at in an arms-length transaction •••• " Id. 
at 488. 
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to recapture the assets through an artificial triggering of a default, 
the Institute was never intended to end up with the assets. 
Perhaps all that is required by way of purchase price substantia-
tion is a finding that the price resulted from real arm's-length nego-
tiations with a properly motivated purchaser. However, the Tax 
Court went a step further in Clay Brown and found that the pur-
chase price was within a reasonable range in light of the earnings 
history of the corporation and the adjusted net worth of the corpo--
rate assets.24 This finding was volunteered .by the Tax Court, possi-
bly in response to the taxpayers' basic theme that there are no 
grounds for denying compliance with the sale prerequisite for cap-
ital-gain treatment if the purchase price is reasonable and the inter-
est retained by the sellers for. security purposes does not extend 
beyond the point of full payment of the purchase price. 
In the Supreme Court, the Commissioner combined his risk-
shifting argument with assertions concerning the absence of a real-
istic purchase price. According to the Commissioner, any bargaining 
in a bootstrap transaction is economically meaningless because of 
the lack of risk-shifting, and an excessive purchase price is inevi-
table. While Mr. Justice White recognized that there was some the-
oretical logic to this argument, he noted that it conflicted with the 
express finding of the Tax Court, supported by evidence in the rec-
ord, that the purchase price was within reasonable limits based on 
the earnings and net worth of the company.25 In addition, Mr. Jus-
tice White observed that if an excessive price is such an inevitable 
result of the lack of risk-shifting, it should be possible for the Com-
missioner to demonstrate that fact instead of failing to offer any 
evidence whatsoever on the ·point.26 
III. REAsoNABLE APPROACH- TO PURCHASE PRICE 
A. Judicial Suggestion for Modified Approach 
No tax abuses can arise from a bootstrap sale if the purchase price 
of the business is within a reasonable range of the value of the stock 
at the time of transfer, and if all interest of the seller terminates 
upon payment of the purchase price. The bootstrap attributes of 
such a transaction can only reduce the amount of capital-gain bene-
24. "The price of $1,300,000 (including the $125,000 of notes) was the result of real 
negotiating. It was within a reasonable range in the light of the earnings history 
of the corporation and the adjusted net worth of the corporate assets." Id. at 486. 
25. 380 U.S. at 573. 
26. Ibid. 
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fits by causing the seller to receive less than the reasonable value of 
the property. Assuming that all interest of the seller terminates upon 
payment of the purchase price, the primary problem in bootstrap 
. sales, if one exists, is to police the amount of the purchase price. 
However, policing the purchase price should take a form other than 
denial of compliance with the "sale" prerequisite for capital-gain 
treatment, since this approach results in the taxation of all the gain 
as ordinary income, not merely the excessive portion. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Clay Brown extended to the 
Commissioner an invitation to modify his position. Mr. Justice 
White suggested that there are more precise approaches to the ques-
tion of possibly excessive purchase prices, and further observed 
that the Commissioner's attack was a clear case of overkill.27 Mr. 
Justice Harlan referred to the Commissioner's contention as an "all 
or nothing theory."28 
The harshness of the Commissioner's "all or nothing" attack 
on bootstrap sales was particularly apparent in the Clay Brown case. 
Clay Brown & Company at the time of sale had a book net worth 
of $619,457, of which $448,471 constituted accumulated earnings 
upon which the corporate tax had been paid. With appraised values 
substituted for book figures, the reconstructed net worth of the 
company was $1,064,877. Moreover, a capitalization-of-earnings ap-
proach supports a value substantially in excess of $1,300,000, which 
was the agreed purchase price.29 Even if the purchase price in Clay 
Brown had been $2,000,000, and $700,000 thereof were deemed 
excessive, why should all the gain be taxed as ordinary income, when 
a substantial portion of the assets represented accumulated earnings 
upon which the corporate tax had been paid? This, in turn, raises 
the question of what criteria should be used for determining the 
reasonable range of a purchase price and what tax consequences 
should result if the price exceeds the reasonable range but falls 
short of being so excessive as to nullify economic substance. 
B. Determination of a Reasonable Price Range 
Revenue Ruling 59-60,30 supplemented by a vast body of case 
law, sets forth the approach, method, and factors to be considered 
in valuing, for estate and gift tax purposes, shares of stock in closely 
held corporations-the property most often sold in bootstrap trans-
27. Id. at 579. 
28. Id. at 581. 
29. See note 32 infra, 
30. 1959-1 CUM. BULL, 237. 
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actions. If the purchase price iii a bootstrap sale is no greater than 
the value that would be assigned under the criteria of Revenue Rul-
ing 59-60, the price should be within a reasonable range.31 
Under Revenue Ruling 59-60, primary consideration is accorded 
to earnings in the valuation of the stock of a closely held corpo-
ration such as Clay Brown & Company. It is clear from an analysis 
of the cases involving such a valuation through capitalization of 
earnings that the earnings record of Clay Brown & Company would 
have justified a price substantially in excess of the $1,300,000 
actually set by the parties to the transaction.32 The facility with 
which the criteria of Revenue Ruling 59-60 support the Clay Brown 
purchase price may account for the Commissioner's failure to raise 
the issue of reasonableness in the Tax Court.33 
C. Treatment of Excessive Portion 
What should be the tax consequence if the valuation criteria 
in Revenue Ruling 59-60, or other appropriate criteria, establish 
that a portion of the purchase price in a bootstrap sale is excessive? 
The answer is suggested by the manner in which the Commissioner 
treats sales between related parties, particularly sales between a 
31. In Rev. Rul. 65-192, I.R.B. 1965-31, 10, the Commissioner announced that the 
general approach and methods of Rev. Rul. 59-60 are applicable to valuations of stock 
for income and other tax purposes as well as for estate and gift tax purposes. The 
"intrinsic value" determined by application of the approach and methods of Rev. 
Rul. 59-60 must not be confused with "fair market value" as the ter-m is used in 
§§ lO0l(b) or 30l(b)(l)(A)-the price at which prope11ty would change hands between 
a willing buyer and seller under no compulsion to buy or sell and having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts. As illustrated by Andrew B. C. Dohrmann, 19 B.T .A. 507 
(1930), and Champlin v. Commissioner, 7 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1934), stock may have sub-
stantial intrinsic value but no "fair market value" because there is no market where 
the holder can sell it for anything approaching its intrinsic value. John H. Altorfer, 
T.C. Mem. 1961-48, held that the "willing seller" concept causes property to lack a 
fair market value when no one will pay what the seller considers a fair price. 
If the owner of a closely held corporation could make a cash sale at the value deter-
mined through the general approach of Rev. Rul. 59-60, he would not consider a boot-
strap sale. The primary motivation of bootstrap sales is the inability to find a purchaser 
willing to pay cash equal to the value determined by the methods of Rev. Rul. 59-60. 
32. Clay Brown &: Company had annual earnings of $339,000 prior to the sale. The 
earnings rate used in valuing stock under the capitalization-of-earnings approach 
generally varies from 6% to 10%, See Florence M. Harrison, 17 T.C.M. 776 (1958). 
An earnings rate of 6% indicates a value of $5,650,000 for the Clay Brown &: Com-
pany stock, and an earnings rate of 10% gives a value of $3,390,000. With an earnings 
rate of 15%, a high rate the Commissioner seldom if ever uses, the value of the 
Clay Brown &: Company stock would be approximately $2,200,000. 
33. It is doubtful that the purchase price in any transaction employing the 
mechanics of the Clay Brown sale would be excessive, since the five-year limitation 
upon leases which the charity could make and still receive the rental tax free means 
that the earnings of the corporation must be sufficient to permit payment of the 
purchase price within the five-year period. A purchase price which can be paid out 
in five years from earnings will ordinarily support a substantially higher value under 
the criteria of Revenue Ruling 59-60. 
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principal stockholder and his corporation, where hard bargaining 
is not expected. There is at least as much chance of an excessive 
purchase price in such transactions as in the case of bootstrap sales. 
However, if the price is excessive in a sale between a principal 
stockholder and his corporation, the Commissioner taxes only the 
excessive portion as ordinary income, permitting capital-gain treat-
ment for the remainder. 
Taxing only the excessive portion as ordinary income fits the 
penalty to the al~eged rule infraction. An example of fitting the 
penalty to the infraction is found in Roy G. Champayne.84 This is 
one of the cases cited in Revenue Ruling 58-353,80 which confirms 
capital-gain treatment under the general capital-gain provisions for 
transfers of all rights in a patent. The patent transfer in the Cham-
payne case was between a majority stockholder and his corporation. 
Because of the relationship between the parties, the .court gave the 
transaction special scrutiny, which resulted in a determination that 
a portion of the consideration was excessive. However, only the 
excessive portion was taxed as ordinary income, and capital gain 
treatment was accorded the remainder. A similar approach was 
taken by the Tax Court in the recent case of Arthur M. Rosenthal,86 
involving the sale of buildings to a corporation controlled by the 
seller. The court held that there was a valid sale to the extent of· 
the fair market value of the properties, but that the excessive por-
tion of the consideration should be treated as disguised dividends 
to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits. 
The presence of bootstrap attributes may call for the same scru-
tiny as do sales between majority stockholders and their corpora-
tions. The dividend rationale of the Rosenthal case is used by the 
Commissioner to tax as ordinary income the excessive portion of 
the purchase price in sales between such related parties. While the 
dividend rationale is not available in a bootstrap sale, there should 
be another, similar rationale to justify this modified approach. 
Capital-gain benefits apply to proceeds from the sale of capital as-
sets, and amounts in excess of the value of such assets at the time 
of transfer represent something other than the proceeds from the 
sale of capital assets. 
The lack of a rationale for taxing only the excessive portion of 
the purchase price as ordinary income did not account for the Com-
missioner's disinclination to pursue this modified approach in Clay 
34. 26 T.C. 634 (1956). 
35. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CVM. BULL. 408. 
36. P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 1J 65254 (Oct. 1, 1965). 
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Brown. During Tax Court. preparations, the taxpayers in Glay 
Brown offered to stipulate that any portion of the purchase price 
found by the court to be excessive should be taxed as ordinary in-
come, if the Commissioner would stipulate that the reasonable por-
tion was entitled to capital-gain treatment. The Commissioner 
declined this proposal. 
The Commissioner has announcea in 'l;IR-76887 that the Glay 
Brown decision does not extend to cases where the amount payable 
to the seller exceeds the fair market value of the stock at the time 
of transfer. In such cases the Commissioner ·will continue to resist 
what he considers an attempt to convert future business profit 
into capital gain. It is not clear whether the Commissioner will treat 
only the excessive portion of the purchase price as future business 
profits, or whether he will revert to his "all or nothing" approach. 
IV. THE COMMISSIONER'S ATTACK EXTENDED BEYOND 
BOOTSTRAP SALES 
The purchase price in a bootstrap sale is a fixed amount. In 
a different type of sale, the amount of the purchase price is measured 
by future income generated by the transferee's use of the property. 
When the amount of the purchase price is measured by future in-
come, payment of the purchase price is necessarily dependent there-
on. The following is a typical transaction in this contingent-price 
category: S, owner of a patent which he purchased from the inventor, 
grants all rights in the patent to Pin consideration of P's agreement 
to pay S a specified percentage of the net profit or gross receipts 
realized by P from his exploitation of the patent during its full re-
maining life. The arrangement permits S to terminate the rights of 
P upon failure of P to pay specified minimum amounts. 
A long line of authorities sustains capital-gain treatment for 
amounts received by S in the above illustration.88 Such transactions 
are classic examples of transfers for a consideration dependent upon 
future income. Since dependency upon future income was the basis 
of the Commissioner's argument for denying capital-gain treatment 
37. TIR-768, Oct. 1, 1965. 
38. See cases cited in Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 408. Section 1235 
applies to the sale or exchange of patents by the inventor or any other individual 
who has acquired his interest in the patent for consideration paid to the inventor 
prior to actual use of the patent. Thus, the transaction depicted in the above illus-
tration is beyond the scope of § 1235, because S was not the inventor and did not 
obtain his interest through consideration paid to the inventor prior to the actual 
reduction to practice. As indicated by the cases cited in Rev. Rul. 58-353, supra, 
§ 1235 is not deemed exclusive, and failure to come within § 1235 does not preclude 
capital-gain recognition under the general. capital-gain provisions. 
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in Clay Brown, he could not ignore these common patent-transfer 
arrangements. However, his problem was compounded by Revenue 
Ruling 58-353,39 in which he had expressly confirmed capital-gain 
treatment for such transfers. 
Unable to reconcile the contingent-price patent transfers with 
his assertion in Clay Brown that there is no compliance with the 
"sale" prerequisite for capital-gain treatment when payment of the 
purchase price is dependent upon future income generated by 
the transferred property, the Commissioner boldly asserted that all 
the cases according capital-gain treatment to patent transfers were in-
correct and that the courts which had rendered those decisions had 
been unduly preoccupied with legalistic property concepts. The 
only reference to Revenue Ruling 58-353 was in a footnote of the 
Commissioner's brief, where it was claimed that the ruling was 
issued merely to stem an increasing tide of adverse court decisions 
"at least for the time being." 
The shift of economic benefits is not the same in a contingent-
price patent transfer as in a bootstrap sale. In patent transfers, the 
seller and the purchaser share proportionately in the income gener-
ated by the patent over its full useful life. There is not the possi-
bility of disproportionate benefits that there is in the case of boot-
strap sales, where all, or substantially all, of the income goes to the 
seller until the purchase price has been paid, and thereafter all of 
the income, as well as the property itself, belongs to the purchaser 
free from any further claims of the seller.40 As noted by Mr. Justice 
White, even if the Commissioner were correct in his contention that 
the decisions which allow capital-gain treatment for contingent-
price patent transfers were erroneous, it would not follow that 
capital-gain recognition should likewise be denied in bootstrap 
sales.41 
Not only do the contingent-price patent transfers covered by 
39. 1958-2 CUM, Buu.. 408. 
40. In a contingent-price transfer, the measure of value is a percentage of future 
income, while in a bootstrap transaction the measure of value is a fixed price. In a 
fixed-price bootstrap transaction, all, or substantially all, of the income generated by 
the transferred assets is devoted to payment of the purchase price. In a contingent-
price transfer, the percentage of income devoted to payment of the purchase price 
is usually a minor fraction, although there may be transactions where there is busi• 
ness purpose and economic substance if the purchaser agrees to pay the seller all 
profits and income realized by the purchaser from the acquired property. Contingent 
prices measure value where it is difficult to fix value in terms of a flat amount. For 
example, a patentable invention must embody a "flash of genius." How can one 
measure the value of such a device prior to ascertaining its commercial feasibility? 
Similarly, there are situations other than patent sales where contingent prices are used, 
See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Cassatt v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 74!i 
(3d Cir. 1943); Estate of Raymond T. Marshall, 20 T.C. 979 (1953). 
41. See 380 U.S. at 577 n.8. 
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Revenue Ruling 58-353 represent classic examples of consideration 
dependent upon future income from the property transferred; such 
transfers are also classic examples of an exact correlation between 
the recoupment of tax basis and payments upon the purchase price. 
& previously mentioned, the acme of 100-cent dollars is seldom 
obtained in bootstrap sales. However, this result is achieved as a 
matter of course in contingent-price sales of patents, since the exact 
amounts paid to the transferor are deductible as depreciation by 
the transferee. The right of the patent transferee to deduct the pay-
ments in full as depreciation is confirmed by the Commissioner's 
published acquiescence in Associated Patentees, Inc.42 Since the 
overall tax benefits sought in bootstrap sales are less than the tax 
benefits routinely attained in contingent-price patent transfers, the 
Commissioner undoubtedly would have changed Revenue Ruling 
58-353 if the Supreme Court had substantiated his contentions in 
Clay Brown. 
v. EFFECT OF SELLER'S OWNERSHIP OF STOCK IN PURCHASER 
In a standard bootstrap transaction, one or more of the selling 
stockholders may own, or desire to own, stock of the purchasing 
corporation. A pertinent inquiry is whether such an arrangement 
will jeopardize capital-gain treatment. 
& a general proposition, capital-gain benefits are not precluded 
by the transferor's ownership of stock in the transferee corporation, 
since a corporation is a taxable entity separate from the stockholders. 
If it were not for the express provisions of section 351 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, a person would realize gain when he receives 
stock or other securities from his wholly owned corporation ·in 
exchange for property which has appreciated in value. The charac-
ter of the gain-capital or non-capital-is unaffected by the trans-
feror's control of the transferee corporation, unless a contrary con-
clusion is dictated by express Code provisions, such as section 1239. 
Under section 1239, ordinary-income treatment is required for gain 
realized upon the sale of depreciable property between an indi-
vidual and a corporation in which the individual owns more than 
eighty per cent of the stock. This amounts to statutory recognition 
that capital-gain treatment is allowed upon the sale of depreciable 
property by an individual to a corporation in which he owns up to 
eighty per cent of the stock. In situations where the property is 
not depreciable, capital-gain treatment is allowed even though the 
seller owns all of the stock of the purchasing corporation. 
42. 4 T.C. 979 (1945), acq., 1959-2 CUM. Buu.. !I. 
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A person who owns eighty per cent of the stock of the purchas-
ing corporation not only retains an indirect beneficial interest in 
the transferred property, but also h:as the ability to acquire a direct 
interest through the simple expediency of liquidating the corpo-
ration. Furthermore, an individual who owns eighty per cent (or 
even fifty-one per cent) of the stock of the purchasing corporation 
may exercise greater control over the corporation's operations than 
is possible through a management contract such as that between 
Clay Brown and the operating company.48 
Although capital-gain treatment is not precluded by the trans-
feror's stock ownership in the transferee corporation unless an ap-
plicable Code provision dictates otherwise, the Commissioner is 
quick to find statutory provisions which he believes alter the gen-
eral proposition. A bootstrap sale under the standard plan involves 
the transfer of property between two corporations and the pay-
ment from earnings of the purchasing corporation to the former 
stockholders of the corporation which has been sold. Nothing more 
is needed for the Commissioner to assert the existence of a reorgani-
zation as defined in section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code. His 
purpose in· :finding such a reorganization is to invoke section 
356(a)(2), which, if applicable, permits taxation of the purchase-price 
payments as dividends.44 
y\There the selling stockholders own eighty per cent or more of 
the stock of the purchasing corporation, the Commissioner might 
43. In his Supreme Court presentation, the Commissioner did not stress the control 
exercisable by Clay Brown over the operating company as a ground for denying 
capital-gain treatment. Nevertheless, control over assets generating payment of the 
purchase price is a cornerstone of Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent. Limitation of the 
purchaser's liability to income generated by the acquired property (and the property 
itself) would not cause negation of a sale, under the dissenting view. Statements made 
by Mr. Justice Goldberg during oral argument indicated that he was aware that 100% 
financing occurred in the business world. It is only when such limitation of liability 
is combined with control over the operation that the dissenting Justices would deny 
capital-gain treatment. In addition to emphasizing the control feature, the dissent 
expressed considerable doubt concerning the propriety of tax exempt institutions 
participating in bootstrap transactions. If the transaction involved in Clay Brown 
had been a standard bootstrap sale where the purchaser, a business corporation, 
supplied the management, there would have been no dissent, even though payment 
of the purchase price were limited to income generated by the transferred business 
and the assets thereof. The only question is how the dissent would regard: (1) a 
standard bootstrap transaction not involving a tax exempt charity where the seller 
controls management during the payout period, or (2) a· bootstrap sale utilizing a 
tax exempt charity where the seller divorces himself from all control over the 
operation. 
44. See Moore, Taxation of Distributions Made in Connection With a Corporate 
Reorganization, 17 TAX L. R.Ev. 129 (1961); Nicholson, Recent Developments in the 
Reincorporation Area, 19 TAX L. R.Ev. 123 (1964). As discussed in note 45 infra, it is 
doubtful that § 356(a)(2) applies to payments made from profits earned after the 
purchase. 
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assert the existence of a section 368(a)(l)(D) reorganization, using the 
rationale employed in the liquidation-reincorporation area.45 I£ the 
selling stockholders do not own eighty per cent of the stock of the 
purchasing corporation, there is no possibility of a clause D reor-
ganization. However, the Commissioner may nevertheless claim a 
clause E or F reorganization, as he has do!le under the liquidation-
reincorporation doctrine even when the stockholders of the trans-
feror corporation ·own less than fifty per cent of the stock of the 
transferee corporation.46 When the stock ownership of the selling 
45. A bootstrap transaction under the standard plan has never been involved in a 
case where the Commissioner has asserted a reorganization. However, the Commissioner 
has successfully asserted a clause (D) reorganization in situations involving § 337. Cases 
in this and related fields are discussed in the articles cited in note 44 supra. Cases 
decided since the publication of these two articles where the Commissioner has estab-
lished the existence of a dividend based on a clause (D) reorganization are: South 
Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965); James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964); 
Harry Trotz, 43 T.C. 127 (1964); Reef Corp., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 
11 65072 (April 9, 1965). 
In the cases involving § 337, the distributions taxed as dividends were those made 
upon liquidation of the acquired corporation. In these § 337 transactions; the acquiring 
corporation purchases the assets of the acquired corporation, which is liquidated with 
its remaining assets (including the purchase price received upon the sale to the 
purchaser) being distributed to the stockholders upon such liquidation. If the purchase 
price is payable on a deferred-payment basis, the deferred-payment obligation is 
distributed to the stockholders of; the acquired corporation upon its liquidation, 
together with the other assets. 1 
In a bootstrap transaction under the standard plan, the liquidating distributions 
are received by the acquiring corporation, not the stockholders of the acquired corpora-
tion. A portion of the cash received by the acquiring corporation upon the liquidation 
of the acquired corporation may be paid as an initial installment upon the purchase 
price for the stock of the acquired corporation. Even· if a bootstrap sale under the 
standard plan is deemed to be a reorganization, can the initial payment made by the 
purchasing corporation from assets received upon liquidation of the acquired corpora-
tion be taxed as a dividend under § 356(a)(2)? In most bootstrap sales, this problem 
would not be particularly acute since the initial payment is usually small, practically 
all of the purchase price being paid from cash flow generated by the purchasing 
corporation's operation of the underlying assets. 
The more important problem is whether there is any basis for taxing as a dividend 
subsequent purchase price payments made by the purchasing corporation from income 
generated by its operation of the underlying assets. Can payments from profits earned 
by the acquiring corporation after the stock transfer and after liquidation of the 
acquired corporation into the acquiring corporation be considered. as cash "boot" 
within the coverage of § 356(a)(2), such coverage being necessary before the Com-
missioner can sustain a dividend assertion? Existence of a reorganization does not 
assure the applicability of § 356(a)(2), although the provision cannot apply unless 
there is a reorganization. There are effective arguments which can be made in opposi-
tion to the applicability of § 356(a)(2) if the Commissioner should rely upon it in a 
bootstrap sale under the standard plan. However, rather than relying upon the non-
applicability of § 356(a)(2) if there is a reorganization, it is better to avoid coverage 
of the reorganization provisions. A clause D reorganization is avoided if stockholders of 
the sold corporation own less than 80% of the stock of the purchasing corporation. 
The assertion of a clause D reorganization has been the Commissioner's main weapon 
in the liquidation-reorganization area. 
46. See Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 CUM, BULL. 62. However, the Commissioner has 
met with little success in urging a clause E or F reorganization where former stock-
holders of "the acquired corporation own less than 80% of the stock of the acquiring 
corporation. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's contentions in Hyman H. 
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stockholders in the purchasing corporation exceeds, or even ap-
proaches, fifty per cent, such ownership should be justified by sound 
business reasons other than the desire to obtain capital-gain 
benefits. 47 
VI. COMPARISON WITH STOCK REDEMPTIONS 
In a bootstrap sale of a closely held corporation, the transferor 
may have a right to the underlying corporate assets and the cash 
flow from them to enforce payment of the purchase price. If a trans-
feror is entitled to only the corporate surplus to enforce payment, 
the label "bootstrap" may be overly strong. Perhaps the term "shoe-
string" is appropriate to denote a transaction in which the trans-
feror has less claim upon the underlying corporate assets than the 
transferor in a bootstrap transaction. 
A typical stock redemption would represent a "shoestring" trans-
action. In such a case, corporation X redeems all the stock of ma-
jority stockholder S for a fixed redemption price payable over a 
period of years. Under the corporation laws of most states, stock 
can be redeemed only out of surplus.48 Mr. Justice Harlan's terse 
observation in the first sentence of his concurring opinion in Clay 
Brown applies with equal force to such a stock redemption: "Were 
it not for the tax laws, the . . . transaction . . . would make no 
sense."49 In a tax-free society, S could receive his share of the 
earnings and surplus indefinitely without limitation, and there 
would be no reason for him to give up his stock interest when pay-
ments from earnings and surplus aggregate a specified sum. 
How strong is the bargaining position of corporation X when 
it negotiates the redemption price for the stock of controlling stock-
holder S? Could a court find that the redemption price results from 
real negotiations in an arm's-length transaction, as did the Tax 
Court in Clay Brown? It seems just as accurate to say that an ex-
cessive purchase price is inevitable in a stock redemption as in the 
case of a bootstrap sale. However, allowance of capital-gain treat-
Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965); Book Production Indus., Inc., P-H 1965 TA.X CT, REP.&: 
MEM. DEC. ,I 65065 (April 2, 1965). In Pridemark, Inc., 42 T.C. 510 (1964), the Tax 
Court sustained the Commissioner's assertion of a clause F reorganization, but its deci-
sion was reversed on appeal. See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir, 
1965). 
47. A strong business purpose was emphasized by the Tax Court when it rejected 
the Commissioner's asserted reorganization in Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962). 
In that case the stockholders owned 38% of the stock of the acquired corporation and 
73% of the stock of the acquiring corporation. Business purpose was also emphasized in 
Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), where the sole stockholder of the acquired 
corporation owned 50% of the stock of the acquiring corporation. 
48. For a discussion of the problems in this area, see Herwitz, Installment Re-
purchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HARv. L. R.Ev. 303 (1965). 
49. 380 U.S. at 579. 
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ment for stock redemptions is imbedded in the tax law through 
section 302 of the Code and related cases. There has been no sug-
gestion that capital-gain benefits are jeopardized by dependency of 
the redemption price upon the underlying corporate assets. Yet, 
such dependency is inherent in stock redemptions.50 
There is a good reason why a stockholder will permit redemption 
of his stock from corporate assets without demanding an excessive 
price. Redemption proceeds are entitled to capital-gain treatment, 
while most other corporate withdrawals are taxed as ordinary in-
come. The rationality of such transactions was perceived by Mr. 
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in the Clay Brown case. 
After relating that the transaction would make no sense if it 
were not for the tax laws, Mr. Justice Harlan observed that the tax 
laws exist as an economic reality in the businessman's world, much 
like the existence of a competitor, and businessmen plan their 
affairs around both. The fact that a transaction is tax-motivated does 
not mean it lacks economic substance. The economic substance of 
a stock redemption is the elimination or substantial reduction of 
the stockholder's interest in the corporation. Such is the thesis of 
section 302. 
From the standpoint of risk-shifting, a bootstrap seller retains 
less risk than a stockholder who has his stock redeemed for a re-
demption price payable over a period of years. A redemption does 
not increase the cash flow of the redeeming corporation, even 
though the redemption price substantially exceeds book value. The 
redeeming corporation obtains no step-up in basis for the corporate 
assets to which the stockholder must look for payment of the re-
demption price. In a bootstrap sale, the purchasing corporation 
receives a tax basis for the corporate assets commensurate with the 
purchase price, thereby increasing the cash flow emanating from 
the assets to which the selJer must look for payment of the purchase 
price. 
VII. IMPACT OF DEPRECIATION RECAPTURE UNDER SECTIONS 1245 
AND 1250 
One benefit which a bootstrap purchaser can offer a prospective 
seller is the increased cash flow available to the purchasing corpora-
tion. The primary source of such increased cash flow is the step-up 
in basis for the depreciable assets under section 334(b)(2) of the 
Code, which permits the purchasing corporation to allocate among 
50. The redeemed stockholder may continue as an officer, director, or employee 
of the redeeming corporation if he has no relationship to the other stockholders 
under the attribution rules of § 318(a). 
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the acquired assets the purchase price of the stock and the liabilities 
assumed. Prior to the enactment of sections 1245 and 1250, the 
step-up in basis could be accomplished without any corresponding 
gain or other tax detriment to the acquired corporation upon its 
liquidation into the purchasing corporation. 
Section· 1245 applies to personal property such as machinery and 
equipment, and section 1250 applies to buildings.61 Under section 
1245, the full step-up in basis of the machinery and equipment is 
taxed as ordinary income to the extent of depreciation taken after 
December 31, 1961. Section 1250 applies to depreciation taken after 
December 31, 1963, and the depreciation recapture varies with the 
length of time that the building has been owned, starting with full 
recapture during the first year and ending with no recapture after 
the tenth year. 
The event in a bootstrap transaction which triggers the applica-
bility of section 1245 or section 1250 is the distribution of the prop-
erty by the acquired corporation to the purchasing corporation 
upon the liquidation of the acquired corporation into the purchas-
ing corporation. Applicability of section 1245 or section 1250 is 
not precluded if the purchaser is a tax exempt institution. The 
depreciation recapture is incurred by the distributing corporation, 
and a tax exempt institution would inherit the liability as trans-
feree to the same extent as a non-tax exempt purchaser. 
While sections 1245 and 1250 are applicable to bootstrap sales 
only to the same extent as to other sales, the impact of these pro-
visions upon bootstrap transactions is particularly severe, since the 
tax costs of the depreciation recapture may, to a considerable extent, 
counteract the additional depreciation available to the purchasing 
corporation. As pointed out to the Supreme Court in Clay Brown, 
bootstrap sales may be relics of a bygone era due to the effect of 
section 1245. Therefore, substantiation of the Commissioner's po-
sition was not required to deal with an acute currently existing 
problem. 
Sections 1245 and 1250 do not apply to tax-free transactions 
such as transfers of assets in connection with reorganizations as 
defined in section 368, or to liquidations of subsidiaries under sec-
tion 332 if section 334(b)(2) is not applicable. The advantages of 
avoiding the impact of sections 1245 and 1250 may outweigh the 
benefits of obtaining a step-up in basis, thereby changing the ground 
rules for corporate sales. Previously, purchasers of corporations at-
tempted to avoid the reorganization provisions of the Code because 
51. See generally Branda, Problems in Recapture of Depreciation, PROCEEDINGS OF 
N.Y.U. 23d ANNUAL INsr. oN FED. TAX. 449 (1965). 
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of the dividend problems discussed earlier. Moreover, the reorgani-
zation provisions provide for a carryover basis for the assets rather 
than a step-up in basis requisite to increased depreciation and cash 
flow. Currently, means may be sought to accomplish corporate buy-
outs under the provisions for tax free reorganizations even where 
the purchase price is payable over a period of years.52 Perhaps the 
next tax frontier in the corporate buy-out field will be the develop-
ment of a plan which will permit a bootstrap transaction without 
causing depreciation recapture under section 1245 or section 1250.53 
\ 
VIII. DEDUCTIBILITY OF RENT BY OPERATING COMPANY 
In another thrust of the three-pronged attack upon bootstrap 
sales involving tax exempt institutions, the Commissioner chal-
lenged the ability of the operating companies to deduct the rent 
payments for income tax purposes. This issue was not involved in 
the Clay Brown case, but the function of the operating company is 
such an integral part of such transactions that the favorable opinion 
of the Supreme Court in Clay Brown should have some impact upon 
the Commissioner's claims regarding the deductibility of the rent as 
a business expense by the operating companies. 
Decisions of the Tax Court on the issue of rentals have varied. 
In Anderson Dairy, Inc.,54 the first decision on the question, the 
Tax Court sustained the right of the operating company to deduct 
the full amount of the rental paid to the tax exempt lessor. The 
decision was based on the fact that the lessor and the operating 
company were unrelated parties, and the Internal Revenue Code 
does not limit deductions for rental payments to a "reasonable 
52. However, one obstacle is the "continuity of interest" requirement. If the 
stockholders of the acquired corporation received only debt obligations of the acquir-
ing corporation, the necessary continuity of interest would be lacking. Even if there 
were a reorganization, the receipt of debt obligations for stock would result in 
the taxation of these securities as "boot" under § 356. Perhaps preferred stock could 
be used in the place of debt obligations. While the requisite continuity of interest 
must be represented by stock, it need not be voting stock. See 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION § 20.59, at 223 (1942); Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Tech-
niques in Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1183 (1957). 
53. The impact of §§ 1245 and 1250 may result in greater use of stock redemptions 
for accomplishing corporate buy-outs along the lines utilized in Zenz v. Quinlivan, 
213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (approved by the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 55-745, 
1955-2 CUM. BULL. 223). In Zenz, a sole stockholder of a corporation sold part of her 
stock to a purchaser, ~d shortly thereafter bad the remainder of her stock redeemed 
by the corporation for an amount equal to the corporation's earned surplus. It may 
be possible to adapt this approach to bootstrap acquisitions by having the purchaser 
acquire a small portion of the stock from the selling stockholder and then have the 
corporation redeem all the remaining stock of the selling stockholder for a redemption 
price payable over a period of years from the earnings of the corporation. However, 
in bootstrap sales, one must also consider the impact of the interest imputation provi-
sions of § 483. 
54. 39 T.C. 1027 (1963). 
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allowance" as in the case of salary or other compensation. Similar 
conclusions were reached in Isis Windows, Inc.55 and Oscar C. 
Stahl.56 
In Royal Farms Dairy Co.57 and Estate of Sol Goldenberg,58 the 
Tax Court reduced the deductible rental from eighty per cent of 
net income as provided under the leases to fifty per cent and fifty-
five per cent respectively. The grounds for these decisions were find-
ings that, although the rental amounts were part of the standard 
formula used by tax exempt institutions in such transactions, the 
purpose of these two rental arrangements was to give the lessors 
funds with which to pay the purchase price of the stock. According 
to the Tax Court, this, together with lack of substantial negotiations 
between the lessor and the operating company, militated against 
the argument that the rental was required as a condition to the 
operating company's use of the leased property. 
When the full background of rental formulas is understood, 
standardization of the rental provision supports rather than refutes 
the conclusion that the operating company had no alternative but 
to accept the formula if it desired to participate in the transaction. 
The tax exempt purchaser must obtain approximately eighty per 
cent of the income generated by the underlying corporate assets if 
it is to enjoy a competitive advantage over bootstrap propositions, 
which could be offered under the standard plan not involving tax 
· exempt institutions.59 Why should the operating company engage 
in futile negotiations for a lower percentage, particularly if the 
eighty per cent figure is also attractive from the lessee's viewpoint? 
An opportunity to obtain the use of all the assets of a going busi-
ness for an obligation to pay eighty per cent of the generated income 
is most appealing to a prospective lessee. The lack of liability for 
rental if no income is realized warrants a limitation of the lessee's 
share of profits to twenty per cent. Is there any better example of 
a fair rental rate than one which not only satisfies the lessor's require-
ments for obtaining funds with which to pay the purchase price for 
the leased assets, but is also attractive to the lessee? 
55. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. ,r 63176 (1963). 
56. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 1f 63201 (1963). 
57. 40 T.C. 172 (1963). 
58. P-H 1964 TAX Cr. REP. & MEM. DEC, 1f 64134 (1964), 
59. Rental of 60% of net income would leave only 54 cents out of each generated 
dollar for payment upon the purchase price if the tax exempt purchaser retained 
10% of the rental. Fifty-four cents is only slightly higher than the 48-cent minimum 
obtainable under the standard bootstrap plan. Rental of 70% of net income would 
leave 63 cents out of each generated dollar for payment upon the purchase price, 
As previously discussed in note 9 supra and accompanying te.xt, handling of the 
Clay Brown transaction under the standard plan would have produced an average of 
65 cents over the 5-year period. 
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Operating companies in transactions of the Clay Brown type 
must accept the eighty per cent rental formula if they desire to 
participate. The only question is whether the required payment of 
eighty per cent of net income is rental, or payments in a joint under-
taking to supply the lessor with the required funds.60 Regardless of 
how the payments are labeled, the operating company should not 
be taxed with income which the company was required to relin-
quish as a condition to participation in the transaction. 
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
On the basis of only a casual observation, transactions of the 
Clay Brown type may appear to have the aura of tax avoidance 
schemes lacking in economic substance. However, they are actually 
sheep in wolves' clothing. The Commissioner used the off-beat trap-
pings as the occasion for launching an attack which, if successful, 
would have created an open season for sheep previously considered 
secure in the capital-gain sanctuary. The Supreme Court detected 
the true nature of the animal despite the Commissioner's loud cries 
of "wolf." 
In Clay Brown, the Supreme Court sustained the tax cornerstone 
of bootstrap sales by holding that capital-gain treatment is not pre-
cluded merely because payment of the purchase price is wholly 
dependent upon cash flow generated by the transferred property and 
upon the property itself. Such capital-gain benefits are available 
even though the seller manages the property during the pay-out 
period. This holding is supported by economic substance attribut-
able to the obligation of the seller to relinquish all interest in the 
transferred property upon full payment of the purchase price. 
Economic substance may be lacking when the purchase price is 
so high as to make it obvious at the time of transfer that the parties 
contemplate a default which will permit the seller to recapture the 
assets. Similarly, the price may be so high as to make it clear at the 
time of transfer that the assets will be completely exhausted in the 
process of paying the purchase price. 61 If the purchase price is not 
sufficiently high to vitiate the economic substance of a transaction, 
60. Present indications are that the Commissioner will concentrate on the joint 
undertaking or joint venture approach against the charitable institutions. This will 
terminate his campaign against the operating companies. The Tax Court case involving 
Fortuna Sawmills, Inc. (the operating company in Clay Brown) was on the February 
Portland, Oregon calendar of the Tax Court. Pursuant to the request of counsel for 
the Commissioner, the hearing was postponed until the Commissioner has made a 
definite decision concerning his position. 
61. See the discussion in note 22 supra dealing with the issue of whether this 
lack of economic substance would actually negate capital-gain treatment. · 
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but it nevertheless exceeds a reasonable range, the door is left open 
for the Commissioner to tax the excessive portion as ordinary income. 
The Clay Brown decision was not a defeat for the Commissioner 
which will open the floodgates of tax avoidance. It was merely a 
judicial admonition to correlate his assertions with economic reality. 
There simply is nothing wrong with a bootstrap sale where the 
purchase price is reasonable and the seller is obligated to relinquish 
all rights to the purchaser upon full payment of the purchase price. 
Ordinary income is not converted into capital gain when a reason-
able purchase price is payable from cash fl.ow generated by the 
underlying corporate assets. 
If the Supreme Court had adopted the Commissioner's conten-
tion of "no sale" unless there is a substantial down payment from 
independent sources or meaningful personal liability, how large 
should the down payment be and how much financial aflluence must 
the purchaser possess to assure capital gain treatment for the seller? 
The Commissioner made it clear in his Supreme Court brief that 
these were questions of degree, requiring judgment based on all 
the circumstances.62 Such an unsettled state of affairs would militate 
agai11st any deferred-payment sale, since a seller would run a risk as 
to whether the size of the down payment or financial affluence of 
the purchaser fell within or beyond the shadowy boundary line. 
Under the Commissioner's assertions, only the :financially afflu-
ent would be capable of assuring capital-gain benefits for a seller. 
In the past, however, bootstrap purchases have been a primary 
method for attaining financial aflluence. Considerable romance 
would depart from the American economic scene if the "have nots" 
could not compete with the "haves" for the purchase of businesses. 
Whether tax exempt institutions should share in the romance is a 
separate question, but the Commissioner did not restrict his attack 
in Clay Brown to transactions involving tax exempt institutions. 
He asked the Court to sound the death knell for all bootstrap sales. 
The Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's swe<;!ping asser-
tions, and it is hoped that Congress will exercise the same discretion, 
regardless of what may be done in regard to bootstrap participation 
of charitable institutions or loss corporations. 
62. "It hardly needs adding that whether any given down payment or pledge of 
other assets or of personal liability is sufficient to qualify a particular transaction 
as a sale is, of course, a question of degree, requiring a judgment based upon all the 
circumstances bearing on the extent to which there has been a significant shift of 
the risks. The judgment would have to take into account, for example, not only the 
absolute amount of the down payment or its relationship to the price but also such 
factors as the speculative or stable nature of the asset • • • ." Brief for Appellant, 
p. 58, Commissioner v. Clay Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). 
